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 Introduction to the market failure of neglected tropical diseases; 
 Assess the adequacy of public-private partnerships; 
 A mapping of public-private partnership(s) per disease; 
 No impact evaluation of public-private partnerships could be found; 
 The literature on public-private partnerships is mainly descriptive; 
 
Abstract 
Pharmaceutical companies are reluctant to invest in research and development (R&D) 
of products for neglected tropical diseases (NTDs) mainly due to the low ability-to-pay 
of health insurance systems and of potential consumers. The available preventive and 
curative interventions for NTDs mostly rely on old technologies and products that are 
often not adequate. Moreover, NTDs mostly affect populations living in remote rural 
areas and conflict zones, thereby hampering access to healthcare. The challenges posed 
by NTDs have led to the proliferation of a variety of public-private partnerships (PPPs) 
in the last decades. We conducted a systematic review to assess the functioning and 
impact of these partnerships on the development of and access to better technologies for 
NTDs. Our systematic review revealed a clear lack of empirical assessment of PPPs: no 
impact evaluation analyses could be found, which are crucial to realize the full potential 
of PPPs and to progress further towards NTDs elimination. 
 
Keywords: Public-private partnerships; Neglected tropical diseases;Health economics; Public 
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Introduction 
Neglected tropical diseases (NTDs) are a diverse group of communicable diseases that 
affect more than one billion people, mainly across the developing world. The World 
Health Organization (WHO) lists 17 NTDs: Buruli Ulcer, Chagas disease, Dengue, 
Chikungunya, Dracunculiasis (guinea-worm disease), Echinococcosis, Endemic 





Leishmaniasis, Leprosy, Hansen disease, Lymphatic filariasis, Onchorcerciasis (river 
blindness), Rabies, Schistosomiasis, Soil-transmitted helminthiases, Taeniasis, 
Cysticercosis, Trachoma (1). It is common for people infected with NTDs to be hit by 
multiple pathogens; impairing physical and cognitive development, and leading to an 
estimated 534 000 death yearly (2). These diseases were associated with 26.06 million 
disability adjusted-life years (DALYs) (3). NTDs have a serious impact on work 
productivity: the largest of which seems to be due to blindness from onchocerciasis and 
severe manifestations of schistosomiasis (4). Overall, these 17 diseases have been 
estimated to cost billions of dollars to developing economies each year (3). 
The development of new treatments and vaccines cannot be incentivized through the 
usual patent system, for the ensuing reasons. First, the patent system grants monopoly 
power to pharmaceutical companies, usually for a period of 20 years, to encourage 
investment in research and development (R&D). The resulting lack of competition 
enables pharmaceutical companies to recoup R&D investment costs by setting a market 
price well above the marginal cost of production. Pharmaceutical companies are hence 
reluctant to invest in R&D for diseases that predominantly affect low and middle-
income countries (LMICs) because of the health insurance system and consumers’ 
reduced ability-to-pay. Second, as LMICs are often characterized by poor local 
infrastructure and sanitation, lack of political commitment and bad governance in the 
health sector, lack of drug safety harmonization and weak legal frameworks, there can 
be no guarantee that a developed product will necessarily reach the population in need, 
thereby discouraging investment in R&D (5)(6)(7).  
Translating this market failure into real facts, only five new therapeutic products were 
approved for NTDs between 2000 and 2011, accounting for less than 1% of the total 
products approved (i.e. 5 products out of 850). A significant share of the newly 
approved products instead targeted neuropsychiatric disorders (13%) and cardiovascular 
diseases (10%) (8). This issue was pointed out by Bill Gates who, in 2008, called for  
“creative capitalism”(9), which include push, pull and mixed (push-pull) schemes. Push 
schemes reduce upfront costs inherent to R&D activities through various grants and 
subsidies offered prior to product discoveries – examples include R&D grants and direct 
funding. Pull schemes, on the contrary, offer a variety of rewards that are contingent on 





and priority review voucher (PRV). Push, pull and mixed schemes offer avenues for 
PPPs to overcome the barriers to the development of products for NTDs.  
In 2011, half of the 34 new formulations for NTDs in clinical development – of which 
85% were in Phase 2 or 3 – were sponsored through PPPs, charities, foundations and 
philanthropic institutions (8). PPPs, so far, have mainly used push schemes, with 
government (e.g. The United Kingdom Department for International Development) or 
philanthropic (e.g. Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation) bodies providing upfront 
financing for clinical trials. The role of PPPs mainly lies in product development (PDPs; 
e.g. The Drug for Neglected Disease Initiative (DNDi)) and in product delivery and 
uptake (Access PPPs; e.g. The Onchocerciasis Control Program (OCP)). Other types of 
PPPs include financing and coordinating partnerships (10). The different types of 
partnerships are not mutually exclusive: while it is more common for partnerships to 
dedicate themselves to one particular role, some use a hybrid model (10).  
Tackling NTDs has become a major goal subscribed by the international community: 
the London Declaration – signed in 2012 – aims to reach the control or elimination of at 
least 10 NTDs by 2020 (11). Various PPPs, with differing models, have hence been put 
in place to achieve this objective (12). These have expanded over the past 20 years, and 
for some, the impacts are now measurable. Accordingly, we believe that it is now within 
researchers’ reach to assess the effectiveness and impact of these alliances. We thus 
conducted this review to respectively: (i) assess the scientific opinion on the adequacy 
and viability of PPPs; (ii) identify potential best mechanism(s) between push, pull and 
mixed ones; (iii) map the different partnerships and analyze their role in reaching the 
globally set goal to control, eliminate or eradicate NTDs.  
 
Study data and methods 
Search strategy and selection criteria 
A systematic literature search on PPPs for NTDs was performed over three databases: a 
general (Scopus), a bio-medical (PubMed) and an economic (IDEAS – Research Papers 
in Economics, REPEC) database. The search was conducted over three different 





instance, enabled us to capture the economic perspective – a crucial feature – of PPPs 
and hence of the push, pull and hybrid mechanisms. In order to not discard any 
initiatives (e.g. Onchocerciasis Control Program was launched in 1974), we searched 
for peer-reviewed articles published between – and as far as – January 1970 and August 
2016 in English or French using the following search terms: (public-private 
partnership* OR public private partnership* OR PPP* OR product-development 
partnership* OR product development partnership* OR PDP*) AND (neglect* tropical 
disease* OR neglect* disease* OR each NTD of the WHO list). We first screened the 
“titles”, “abstracts” and “keywords” of all extracted records. Next, we read the full text 
articles to evaluate them according to our inclusion criteria. The titles and abstracts of 
the extracted records were independently reviewed by two investigators (CA&TS). 
Records were excluded if, PPPs (i) were only mentioned in the conclusion or as a 
recommendation, (ii) focused on diseases that are not on the World Health Organization 
(WHO) NTDs list; (iii) considered NTDs of the WHO list but not for human species. 
Additionally, editorial material such as interviews, forum/symposium and round table 
discussion, comments and profile articles were excluded. All the remaining records 
were included in the review. If discordances occurred, they were resolved through 
discussions with a third investigator (ES); who would retrieve the full text in case of a 
doubt. The full text papers were then classified into three categories, based on the nature 
of their content:  
i. Descriptive studies of PPPs context 
ii. Descriptive studies of PPPs experiences  
iii. Empirical studies   
‘Descriptive studies of PPPs context’ review the weaknesses and strengths of the push, 
pull and mixed schemes. These were scrutinized tabulating the following features (cf. 
table V in appendix): scheme(s) or type(s) of partnership discussed; associated 
drawback(s); recommended scheme(s) or partnership(s); associated advantage(s); policy 
recommendation(s); and whether the paper mentions elimination. ‘Descriptive studies 
of PPPs experience’ report the existence, main characteristics, achievement and 
limitations of PPPs. These were analyzed tabulating the following aspects (cf. table VI 
in appendix): name of the PPP and year of creation; partners; disease(s); tool(s) used; 





whether the paper mentions elimination. ‘Empirical studies’ had a concise research 
purpose that was addressed via data-based analyses (qualitative and/or quantitative). 
These were examined tabulating the following features (cf. table VII in the appendix): 
research question; methodological approach; main finding(s); limitation(s) of the study; 
and whether the paper mentions elimination.  
 
Results  
The search resulted in 198 non-duplicate articles, among which 6 could not be accessed. 
After abstract screening and full-text review, 74 articles were assessed eligible (cf. 
Figure 1 for PRISMA diagram).   
 
Descriptive studies of PPPs context 
Push schemes 
Push schemes have been heavily criticized in the literature. First, since push schemes 
subsidize research input and not research output, they may finance unsuccessful R&D 
activities (13). Second, they tend to suffer from a moral hazard and adverse selection 
problem (5)(14). Moral hazard arises due to asymmetric information between grant 
recipients and donors. Since donors know less than grant recipients about the success 
probability, cost and evolution of the project, they cannot perfectly monitor the 
activities of grant recipients. The effectiveness of the program can then be jeopardized if 
grant recipients have differing incentives from donors. Accordingly, donors are faced 
with the issue of picking the ‘right’ grant recipient. Common examples of push schemes 
are R&D grants, R&D tax credit and patent pools – which are described in table I. 
So far, push mechanisms have been advocated to decrease the costs of R&D for NTDs: 
mostly to stimulate investment in early phases (i.e. basic research) providing a basis for 
later applied research. Nevertheless, some may argue that the cost of R&D per se does 
not explain the market failure attributed to these diseases. Pharmaceutical companies 
often make risky and expensive investment in products for which they trust having a 





cost and risk of R&D investment, is a potentially more credible barrier than the cost of 
R&D per se (15). This would suggest that pull mechanisms are perhaps better suited to 
stimulate investment in R&D. 
Pull schemes 
Pull schemes guarantee a demand for the final product and hence ensure a positive 
return on R&D investment. Examples of such schemes include AMC, PRV and 
transferable intellectual property (IP) rights – as detailed in the table II.  
Pull schemes also have their criticisms. AMC scheme is subject to the ‘time-
inconsistency’ problem: once R&D investments are sunk, AMC donors may be tempted 
to renegotiate on their promise to obtain the lowest possible price  (13). Moreover, 
AMC donors may encounter difficulties in setting the right ‘AMC prize’; if too low, it 
will discourage companies’ participation and if too high, it will lead to market 
inefficiency (15). Lastly, AMC assumes that companies have the necessary up-front 
fund to finance R&D, which may not necessarily be the case for the small ones (5). 
AMCs have resulted so far in two pneumococcal vaccines, which however have been 
criticised for neither accelerating the innovation cycle nor increasing availability. With 
respect to the PRV, there has been little evidence in the last decade that its benefits are 
going to where they were intended (16). To date, the FDA has awarded 4 PRVs to: an 
antimalarial drug (coartem), a multidrug resistant tuberculosis medicine (bedaquiline), 
an oral treatment for leishmaniasis (miltefosine) and a cholera vaccine (Vaxchora) (17). 
Among these 4 products, 3 were already developed and registered outside the United 
States (US) well before the voucher system was launched (17)(16). The PRV may 
inadvertently distorts incentives for developing novel and pioneering drugs by pushing 
through the development of close substitutes, known as me-too drugs (5).  
Hybrid schemes 
Mixed schemes use a combination of push and pull mechanisms; however examples are 
few. A well-known one is the orphan drug act (ODA) adopted in the US, Europe, Japan 
and Australia (5). The ODA offers an income tax credit equal to 50% of clinical trial 
expenses (push scheme) and extends patent rights with up to 7 years market exclusivity 
(pull scheme) (5) (18)(13). Although the ODA has proved to be successful in high-





relevant for drugs that can be sold at a very high price affordable for health insurance 
systems in HICs (5). Mixed schemes however are not restricted to the ODA; different 
combinations are possible.  
Push, pull and mixed schemes offer opportunities for PDPs but when it comes to Access 
PPPs, the incentive is left on the patent’s holder concern. There is a certain consensus 
that PDPs should adopt a mixed scheme strategy (6)(13)(18)(15)(19)(20). That is, PDPs 
should first use push schemes to encourage investments in the earlier phases of R&D 
(e.g. R&D grants, prize mechanism, etc.) that would be then pulled along by financial 
commitments (e.g. AMC and PRV) from the public sector and philanthropic partners to 
encourage further investment in costly phase II and III (18) (20) (19).  
 
Descriptive studies of PPPs experiences 
The main motives behind PPPs are to respond to the lack of safe, affordable, easy-to-
use and efficacious treatments (i.e. PDPs) (21) (22) and ensure delivery of products to 
populations affected by NTDs (i.e. Access PPPs) as illustrated in table III.  
The most cited partnerships in the literature are the ones that include drug donations of 
Ivermectin by Merck & Co targeting onchocerciasis and lymphatic filariasis (i.e. OCP, 
APOC, OEPA, GPELF). PPPs are not equally distributed among NTDs: some NTDs 
could not be attributed any (e.g. dracunculiasis (guinea-worm disease), echinococcosis, 
endemic treponematoses, yaws, hansen disease, taeniasis) while others such as 
onchocerciasis, schistosomiasis and human African trypanosomiasis have 5 or more 
initiatives. The distribution of PDPs and Access PPPs across NTDs – i.e. the number of 
different initiatives found per NTD in the literature – is illustrated in Figure 2 and 3 
respectively. The partnerships are mainly PDPs, followed closely by ‘Access PPPs’ 
(through mass drug administration (MDA)). Other types of partnership act as a 







Are PPPs capable of reaching NTDs elimination? 
PDPs and ‘Access PPPs’ provide an opportunity to reach NTDs elimination (23). So far, 
NTDs control and elimination strategies have mainly relied on MDA with drug donated 
by large pharmaceutical companies and repeatedly administered to populations (i.e. 
Access PPPs) (24). This approach has been named as “preventive chemotherapy” by the 
WHO for diseases like lymphatic filariasis (i.e. GPELF) and trachoma (i.e. ITI) because 
it is leading to the interruption of transmission and disease elimination (25). However, 
for most NTDs such as onchocerciasis, hookworm, schistosomiasis, dengue, 
leishmaniasis, and Chagas disease, new molecular entities (NMEs) as well as additional 
control tools are truly needed (23)(25)(26). In 2011, the funding gap for drug alone was 
estimated at $222 million USD (27). The needed control tools include preventive 
vaccines and easy-to-use, reliable and low-cost diagnostics to identify infected patients; 
monitor the impact of MDA programs; and survey disease re-emergence (20).  
 
Empirical studies of PPPs 
Only 8 out of the 74 papers assessed eligible, attempted to address a specific research 
purpose using either quantitative and/or qualitative methods. Although using research 
methods, the types of analysis remain particularly descriptive (e.g. assess the number of 
drugs developed under a PPP over 2009-2013; examine the funding patterns of PPPs; 
etc.) Not a single in-depth impact evaluation analysis of PPPs could be found despite 
their critical role in assessing PPPs efficiency. Only one economic evaluation – a cost-
effectiveness analysis – was found, and revealed that the PDP model is not the most 
cost-effective approach if it acts as a push scheme through R&D grants (18). Each study 
is summarized in table IV. 
 
Discussion  
The scientific literature on PPPs for NTDs is predominantly descriptive. An important 
part of the literature focuses on narrative descriptions of specific partnerships. A smaller 
but still significant share of the literature describes the different schemes – push, pull 





the small number of empirical studies: only 8 studies out of 74 had a research objective 
that was assessed through empirical investigation. 
PDPs are loosely defined and the decision regarding which scheme to adopt is not 
unanimous. Nevertheless, it seems that overall mixed schemes should be applied to 
PDPs but the equilibrium between push and pull incentives is still to be defined in the 
context of NTDs, as it was done for rare diseases (i.e. ODA). PDPs are also subject to 
various criticisms that need to be addressed. These include, among others: (i) their lack 
of transparency, accountability, clear government structure, and alignment with country 
priorities and systems (28)(14)(29); (ii) their tendency to alter existing medicines rather 
than creating new ones (30)(29); and the lack of coordination between sectors and 
partners resulting in duplicated efforts (28). PDPs’ generalized lack of transparency, for 
instance, is a potential reason for the dearth of empirical research conducted on the 
topic. Without transparency, pharmaceutical companies are not forced to report on 
donations received, private investments made, R&D time frame and success rates. With 
respect to Access PPPs, the criticisms are fewer and mainly highlight the need for 
greater epidemiologic surveillance following the end of a partnership (31)(32). Lastly, 
PDPs and Access PPPs have distinctive roles but – as underlined in the literature – these 
should not be mutually exclusive (33)(34). The fact that large-scale manufacturing, 
adoption and distribution of developed products in low income countries are not a 
compulsory requirement of PDPs, reveals a dichotomy between the two (34). Hence, 
schemes should be revised and designed in a way that not only encourages investment 
in R&D but also in product delivery and uptake. Greater harmony between the 
development and delivery processes within PPPs is crucial to reach NTDs elimination 
(29).  
To conclude, PPPs present numerous advantages over the traditional pharmaceutical 
industry development process. Thanks to their flexibility, PPPs have the ability to tap on 
each of the participants’ comparative advantage(s). PDPs and Access PPPs, together, 
provide a great opportunity to tackle the challenges posed by NTDs. However, in order 
to make the best of these alliances, one must evaluate their impact; analyze how 
differences in their characteristics affect their performance. The research on PPPs for 
NTDs is hindered by the limited availability of standard, consistent, and routinely 





Daniel et al., “no single routinely updated, publicly available database exists to evaluate 
pharmaceutical innovation” (35). There is one database, called G-FINDER, which 
reports on the public, philanthropic and private funding to partnerships but not on their 
specific characteristics and scientific progress. To deal with this lack of transparency 
and ensuing shortage of data, one could require partnerships to register on a single 
platform, on which partners would have to declare all funding received; investments 
made; starting and ending dates of each clinical step; etc. This incentive to the public 
provision of information on partnership could be enhanced by a scheme, as suggested in 
the literature: “transparency in exchange for public funds” (5). In addition to the lack of 
data, the research is challenged by the absence of a counterfactual to which PPPs for 
NTDs could be compared; as it is unlikely to see non-PPP models for diseases that 
mainly affect the poor. However, assessing how different characteristics of PPPs – such 
as geographic coverage, stakeholders involved, funding and governance structure – 
affect the desired outcome would already provide good insights into how the model 
could be optimized; shedding light on the drivers of their success or failure.  
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Figure 2: Distribution of product-development partnerships(PDPs) across NTDs 
 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of Access PPPs across NTDs 














































Table I: Push mechanisms: advantage(s) and disadvantage(s) 
Push mechanisms Advantage(s) Disadvantage(s) 
R&D grant: these grants are 
provided to innovators in 
advance of drug discovery. 
They encourage small 
companies with less capital to 
step in (18). 
Moral hazard and adverse 
selection problem: companies 
may exaggerate the R&D cost 
in order to receive more 
funding (18)(5). 
R&D tax credit: companies 
investing in R&D for NTDs 
are eligible for reduced 
taxation. 
Widely used to stimulate 
research in a specific area 
(15). 
Tax credit can only benefit 
companies with large tax 
burden (i.e. income earning 
ones). Hence it is not relevant 
to smaller companies whom 
generally play a crucial role 
in the product development 
process (18)(5)(15). 
Patent pools (i.e. open-
source R&D): invite patent 
owners to cross-license their 
patents, either between each 
other or to third parties, 
which can subsequently be 
used for further research. 
Patent pools avoid 
negotiation with each patent 
holder (36). 
The viability of patent pools 
is questionable as these have 
been poorly used (29). There 
is also a risk of anti-
competitive behavior due to 







Table II: Pull mechanisms: advantage(s) and disadvantage(s) 
Pull scheme Advantage(s) Disadvantage(s) 
Advance market 
commitment (AMC): donors 
make a prospective 
commitment to purchase a 
successful product at a pre-
specified price for a fixed 
quantity. 
The reward is only granted 
once a viable product has 
been developed (15). 
Time-inconsistency problem 
(13); Difficulty is setting the 
right AMC prize (15); may 
not be appealing to small 
pharmaceutical companies 
(5). 
Priority review voucher 
(PRV): Pharmaceutical 
companies are granted by the 
food and drug administration 
(FDA) a priority review 
voucher (i.e. review within 6 
months) upon successful 
development of a product for 
a NTD. The voucher can be 
sold to a third party and  may 
be valued at about US$300 
million or more by a 
company with a potential 
blockbuster drug candidate 
(5). 
PRV encourages R&D for 
NTDs while promoting 
welfare gains from earlier 
market access in high income 
countries (HICs). 
PRV may not necessarily 
reward the true innovators 
(37). 
Transferable IP rights: 
pharmaceutical companies are 
awarded an IP extension for a 
product of their choice 
conditional on successfully 
bringing a NTD product on 
the market. 
This scheme is potentially 
very attractive to big 
pharmaceutical companies 
(15). 
IP extension translates into 
high prices for a prolonged 
period, imposing a burden on 
patients whom are in need of 
the product for which the 








Table III: Public-private partnership(s) per disease 






Tool(s) Comment Citation of 
the PPP 
Buruli Ulcer WIPO Re:Search 
consortium 
NA NA (38) 






NA (21) (39) 
















































The PDP has not 
yet led to a vaccine 
candidate but has 
resulted in the 


















After the program, 




























Program houses and schools 
with immature Ae. 
Aegypti had 
decreased (41) 
Chikungunya PHYTOCHIK PDP: 
Bioprospection 
to develop drug 
candidates  
During the first 2 










   
Echinococcosis No partnerships 
found 





   
Yaws No partnerships 
found 







































The objective is to 
threat > 86% of the 
cattle population 
which will weaken 
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and is now 
recommended by 
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Hansen disease No partnerships 
found 
























in 9.5 million 
individuals 
already infected 








































































































In 2012, the 
program was 
treating over 90 
million people 










large areas of 11 
countries (55) 
 





















































































endemic areas in 
Mexico, Guatemala 











DNDi has drug 
candidates in phase 




































Rabies No partnerships 
found 
   











completed phase 2 
and phase 3 
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Both antigens are 
cur- rently in Phase 
1 trials in Gabon 













Taeniasis No partnerships 
found 
   



































Drug donation of 
Zithromax by 
Pfizer 
ITI is working on 
the WHO goal of 
eliminating 
blinding trachoma 
by the year 2020 
(32)(22)  







Table IV: Empirical studies  
Study Research question Methodology and 
Data sources 
Main findings 
(70)  To measure progress 
in neglected diseases 
drug development. 
Assess the number of 
drugs approved that 
were developed 
under a PPP between 
2009 and 2013 
according to 
ClinicalTrials.gov, 





57% of the 20 newly approved 
products for neglected diseases 
were developed under a PPP but 
60% of these were for HIV and 
malaria. 
(71) To assess the 
contribution of 
Medicine for Malaria 
Venture (MMV), 
DNDi and the One 
World Health (OWH) 
on their products’ 
availability, 
affordability and 
adoption in LICs. 
The framework 
developed by Frost 
and Reich (2008) 
(72) using publicly 
available sources. 
To various extents, these 
partnerships have successfully 
ensured products’ registration, 
distribution and adoption into 
national treatment policies in 
LICs, but ensuring broad and 
equitable access still remains an 
issue. 
(18) To compare the cost-
effectiveness of the 
PDP (categorized as 
push scheme) with the 
advance market 
commitment scheme 
(pull scheme) and 
mixed schemes (PDP 
until phase II trials, 
Cost-effectiveness 
analysis. Estimates 
of costs associated 




reaching one phase 
to the other were 
Although the PDP scheme was 
the cheapest option, the number of 
disability adjusted-life years 
(DALYs) averted was much lower 
than for the mixed scheme and 
advance market commitment 






followed by AMC 
afterward) for 
vaccines’ development 
for neglected diseases. 
obtained from the 
literature. The health 
impact was measured 
using a baseline case 
from a WHO report 
of potential 
disability-adjusted 




(73) To examine the role of 
PDP in R&D for 
neglected diseases 
To examine the 
funding pattern of 14 
PDPs for neglected 
diseases during the 
year 2007 using the 





The Bill and Melinda Gates 
foundation remains the principal 
funder of PPPs (50% of annual 
income), followed by four public 
funders: the US Agency for 
International Development 
(USAID), the UK Department for 
International Development 
(DFID), the Dutch ministry of 
foreign affairs, and the Irish Aid 
(collectively contributing to 28% 
of annual income). 
(74) To measure the 
correlation between 






among 17 global 
health initiatives 
using Official 
statements of PPPs 





For the public sector – whilst not 
for the private sector – this 
correlation exists and is positive. 
(75) To understand crucial 
elements in the 
Systematic review 
over 12 databases 
10 of the 212 references initially 





partnership process final review. The development 
stage requires: share goals and 
values; equality of power relation; 
exchange of expertise and 
resources; stakeholder 
engagement; and assessment of 
the local health capacity while the 
management stage requires: 
transparency; communication; and 
engaged decision-making 
amongst partners. 
(76) To assess the progress 
of pharmaceutical 
companies in meeting 
the commitments on 
drug donations set at 
the London 






trade journals as well 
as surveys 
administered to 10 
company signatories. 
Substantial progress has been 
reported, with 17 donation 
programs across 10 disease 
categories. 
(77) To examine the 
evaluation of the 
Mectizan donation 




interviews of 25 
partners 
Overall, the program was rated 
highly beneficial. However the 
two main pitfalls were: that the 
activities may not reach the 
primary constituency of the 
partner’s program and the effort 
of the individual organization may 
not be recognized. 
 
 
